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BIGELOW AEROSPACE'S COMMODITY JURISDICTION REQUEST UNDER ITAR 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SPACEFLIGHT 
Mark J. Sundahl 
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
United States 
mark.sundahl@law. csuohio. edu 
ABSTRACT 
On April 22, 2009, Bigelow Aerospace announced that the United States Directorate of 
Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) had responded favorably to Bigelow's commodity jurisdiction 
request to ease its regulatory burden under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR). 
Prior to this decision by the DDTC, the presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow space station 
would have been treated as an "export" of space technology under IT AR - thus requiring a 
license from the DDTC in addition to other burdens. Bigelow Aerospace's successful commodity 
jurisdiction request has removed these obstacles and, as a result, has breathed new life into the 
private spaceflight industry. The DDTC's ruling in this case may also signal a broader shift in the 
application of ITAR. At a minimum, the ruling is an encouraging indication of the DDTC's 
sensitivity to the needs of the commercial spaceflight industry, which could result in the 
continued relaxation of export controls over commercial space technology. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Only rarely do we see breakthroughs in 
space law that bring clear and quantifiable 
benefits to space companies. But such a 
breakthrough occurred this year when the 
United States Department of State's 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC) exempted Bigelow Aerospace from 
the need to acquire a license and comply 
with other burdensome requirements under 
the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (IT AR) before allowing foreign 
nationals aboard their expandable space 
stations. The DDTC's ruling will allow 
Bigelow Aerospace to more easily serve the 
global market since Bigelow will no longer 
have the bear these burdens for each foreign 
national that would set foot in one of their 
space stations. This article tells the story of 
how Bigelow achieved this breakthrough -
and explores how this ruling will affect the 
future of human spaceflight. 
II. ITARAND HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
Export controls on space technology are 
notoriously strict in the United States, where 
all space technology is deemed to be 
munitions and is therefore subject to the 
complicated and restrictive IT AR export 
regulations. Because the costs associated 
with IT AR-compliance must be passed 
along to the customer, the current 
application of IT AR has harmed the ability 
of U.S. companies to compete on the world 
market. The seriousness of this regulatory 
impediment is perhaps best illustrated by the 
practice of certain European satellite 
manufacturers to market "IT AR-free" 
satellites - that is, satellites that are free of 
the regulatory complexities and associated 
costs that flow from IT AR. Such 
advertising ploys are not mere gimmicks, 
but reflect the real benefit that satellite 
operators enjoy when purchasing satellites 
that are beyond the reach of IT AR. As a 
result, European satellite sales have 
increased, cutting deeply into the market-
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share of U.S. manufacturers. Complying 
with IT AR is particularly difficult for 
smaller companies that do not have an in-
house legal staff specializing in export 
controls and already face a multitude of 
challenges as they attempt to establish 
themselves in the marketplace. 
Technically speaking, IT AR prohibits 
the export of any "defense article" without a 
license from the Directorate of Defense 
Trade Controls (DDTC). 1 All items listed on 
the USML qualify as "defense articles," 
including, among other things, all 
"spacecraft" and "satellites" - which would 
presumably include Bigelow's space 
stations.2 
Of particular importance to Bigelow 
Aerospace was that the concept of an 
"export" is broadly defined under IT AR as 
including not only the physical movement of 
defense articles across the borders of the 
United States, but also the disclosure of any 
"technical data" relating to spacecraft to a 
foreign national - even if the foreign 
national is in the United States at the time of 
disclosure.3 The term "technical data" is 
further defined as any information "required 
for the design, development, [or] production 
... of defense articles.'..i Disclosure of such 
technical data without DDTC approval is 
prohibited regardless of the form in which 
such data is displayed or stored (whether in 
documents, models, or other items) and 
regardless of how the data is communicated 
(whether by the sharing of documents, 
email, conversation, or by visual 
inspection).5 As a result, the mere presence 
of a foreign national on a Bigelow space 
station would be deemed to be an "export" 
and would require a license. 
Moreover, the provision of any "defense 
services," which include the provision of 
technical data, requires a Technical 
Assistance Agreement with the recipient of 
1 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 
United States Code of Federal Regulations 
§127.l(a)(l) (hereinafter, C.F.R.). 
2 Id. §§120.6, 121.I (Category XV). 
3 Id. §120.17;seealsoid. §125.2(c). 
4 Id. §120.lO(a)(l). 
5 Id.; see also id. §§120.6, 125.2(c). 
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the data which must then be approved by the 
DDTC.6 The burdens of IT AR grow far 
greater when a U.S. company launches a 
space object from non-NATO territory. 
First, a Technology Control Transfer Plan 
has to be approved by the Department of 
Defense.7 Second, the Department of 
Defense has to be notified in advance of any 
discussions with foreign nationals related to 
the launch - and the DOD then has the right 
to monitor these discussions.8 Finally, the 
DOD has the right to send agents to the 
launch site to monitor the launch as well as 
all related activity and discussions (with all 
travel expenses being borne by owner of the 
space object).9 
III. THE IMPACT OF ITAR ON 
BIGELOW AEROSPACE 
The regulatory burdens of IT AR have 
been eloquently described by Michael Gold, 
the Corporate Counsel and Director of the 
Washington office of Bigelow Aerospace. 
In various publications, Mr. Gold has 
described the surprisingly onerous (and 
often nonsensical) demands that have been 
placed on Bigelow Aerospace as the 
company launched its prototype space 
stations into orbit from Russia. 10 
In what has become one of the more 
famous examples of the regulatory burden 
imposed by IT AR, Mr. Gold has described 
how Bigelow Aerospace was required to 
cover the travel expenses of DDTC officials 
who traveled to Russia to monitor the launch 
of Bigelow's prototypes in Russia in order 
to ensure that the technology would not be 
6 Id. §§ 120.9, 124. I et seq. 
7 Id. §124.15(a)(l). 
8 Id. §§124.15(a)(l), 124.15(a)(2). 
9 Id. §124.15(a)(2). 
'
0 See, e.g., Interview with Michael Gold, Res 
Commun is, April 28, 2008, at 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com/2008104128/i 
nterview-mike-gold-corporate-counsel-bigelow-
aerospace; see also Mike N. Gold, Lost in 
Space: A Practitioner's First-Hand Perspective 
on Reforming the U.S. 's Obsolete, Arrogant, and 
Counterproductive Export Control Regime for 
Space-Related Systems and Technologies, 34 
Journal of Space Law I 63 (2008). 
shared with unauthorized individuals. The 
government monitors kept watch over all of 
Bigelow's equipment no matter how 
ordinary - including a stand that was 
nothing more than a simple table used to 
hold one of the company's prototype space 
stations prior to it being loaded into the 
Space Head Module of the Dnepr. 11 
Although Mr. Gold's candid 
commentary on Bigelow's struggles with the 
IT AR regulations is at times pointed, he is at 
the same time always fair - and even 
complimentary - in his statements about the 
DDTC staff who make rulings on a daily 
basis about how IT AR applies to particular 
situations. He praises the DDTC officers 
who are on the front lines every day making 
difficult determinations about the flow of 
dangerous technology as "very intelligent 
individuals within the Department of 
State."12 And his comments on ITAR go 
beyond simple observations. Mr. Gold has 
written insightfully about the potential 
unconstitutionality of certain aspects of 
IT AR and has made promising 
recommendations for reform, such as his 
call for the granting of greater discretion to 
the DDTC officers who decide whether (and 
under what conditions) a license is necessary 
for the export of a particular product. 13 
Prior to the DDTC ruling that is the 
subject of this paper, Bigelow Aerospace 
would have had to request a license from the 
DDTC before allowing any foreign national 
to set foot on one of its space stations. For 
example, if Bigelow placed into orbit a 
space station that was to be visited by 
foreign nationals, IT AR would have 
required that Bigelow obtain a license (by 
submitting a DSP-5 form) for each foreign 
national that was anticipated to inhabit the 
space station. This requirement would also 
apply to any third party that might purchase 
a Bigelow space station. That is, if Bigelow 
11 Res Communis, supra note 6. 
12 Id. 
13 Leonard David, Genesis-I: Reaching Escape 
Velocity from Red Tape, Space.com, July 26, 
2006, at http://www.space.com/businesstechno 
logy/060726 _itar _genesis-I .html. 
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placed a space station into orbit and then 
transferred the station to a U.S. purchaser, 
the purchaser would have to obtain a license 
prior to permitting a foreign national to enter 
the space station. In addition to the costs of 
seeking such a license, there would also 
have been a risk that the DDTC would deny 
a license, thus preventing the foreign 
national from entering the space station at 
all. 
In addition, Bigelow would have been 
required to enter into a Technical Assistance 
Agreement with each foreign passenger 
(which would then be subject to approval by 
the DDTC). Bigelow also faced the 
possibility that the more burdensome 
requirements regarding the creation of a 
Technology Transfer Controls Plan and 
DOD monitoring of all conversations with 
foreign passengers would be triggered if the 
space stations were launched from non-
NA TO countries. 
That these requirements would have 
jeopardized the success of Bigelow's 
operations is clear. For example, if a space 
station were being used as a manufacturing 
facility, the pool of potential non-U.S. 
customers would be threatened by the IT AR 
requirements - which could destroy the 
sustainability of the venture, given the small 
overall size of the global client pool. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF COMMODITY 
JURISDICTION REQUESTS 
One way that a company can escape the 
burdens of IT AR compliance is to ask the 
DDTC to remove the company's technology 
from the USML by way of a "commodity 
jurisdiction request" (referred to hereinafter 
as a "CJ request"). 14 When submitting a CJ 
request, the applicant is requesting that the 
DDTC remove the applicant's technology 
from the USML - thus transferring the 
technology to the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Commerce (DOC) and its 
Export Administration Regulations (EAR). 
The benefit of a jurisdiction transfer to 
the DOC can be significant (depending on 
14 22 C.F.R. §120.4. 
the technology being transferred) because 
the EAR are notably less burdensome than 
are the controls under IT AR. Generally 
speaking, a company is far less likely to be 
required to seek a license from the DOC 
prior to the export of a controlled item (due 
to numerous exceptions to the license 
requirement and the lenient treatment of 
exports to friendly countries). That said, the 
EAR are similar to IT AR in one important 
respect, namely, that both the EAR and 
IT AR treat the sharing of controlled 
technology with a foreign national as an 
export (such sharing of information termed a 
"deemed export" in the EAR). 15 
V. BIGELOW AEROSPACE'S 
COMMODITY JURISDICTION 
REQUEST 
On December 27, 2007, Bigelow 
Aerospace submitted a CJ request to the 
DDTC seeking to remove its expandable 
space platform technology from the 
USML. 16 Although the DDTC usually 
strives to make a determination within sixty 
days of submission, a decision was not to be 
issued in this case for sixteen months. 
Michael Gold remained philosophical during 
what was unquestionably a suspenseful time 
for him and Bigelow Aerospace. When 
asked about the long wait, he showed no 
impatience, but instead insisted that he was 
more interested in a good decision rather 
than a speedy decision. 
The suspense was broken on April 22, 
2009 when Bigelow Aerospace announced 
that the DDTC had responded favorably to 
its CJ request. 17 The DDTC had ruled that 
the presence of foreign nationals on a 
Bigelow space station was "non-licensable" 
15 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(2)(ii). 
16 Space News, "Bigelow Petitions State for 
Export Jurisdiction Change," March 3, 2008; 
Economist, "Space Technology: Earthbound. 
Export Control in the Space Business has Gone 
Overboard," Aug. 23, 2008. 
17 Bigelow Aerospace has not released to the 
public either its commodity jurisdiction request 
or the DDTC's response. 
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under ITAR. 18 Michael Gold had succeeded 
in his argument that just because a person 
has seen a space station doesn't mean that he 
or she can build one. 
This ruling was rather unusual, in that 
the DDTC will typically decide to either 
remove the technology at issue from the 
USML (thus transferring jurisdiction over 
the EAR and the Department of Commerce) 
or to keep the technology on the USML -
and continue to require licenses for export. 
In Bigelow's case, the technology remained 
on the USML, but the requirements for a 
license, Technical Assistance Agreement, 
Technology Transfer Control Plan, and 
monitoring will no longer apply with respect 
to the mere presence of foreign nationals on 
board a Bigelow space station. 
Although it may appear that Bigelow 
Aerospace fell short by not succeeding in 
having their technology removed from the 
USML, this ruling may tum out to be the 
best result for Bigelow since a transfer of 
their technology to the Department of 
Commerce would have likely meant that a 
license would have to have been sought 
under the EAR. However, under the "non-
licensable" ruling, Bigelow does not have to 
apply for licenses from either the DDTC or 
the Department of Commerce. 
Prior to this decision by the DDTC, the 
presence of foreign nationals on a Bigelow 
space station would have triggered the 
various burdens under IT AR. The 
continuation of this policy would have 
placed an extraordinary burden on Bigelow 
due to the expensive and time-consuming 
process of complying with these 
requirements for each foreign national 
present on a Bigelow space station. 
Bigelow's successful CJ request has 
removed these obstacles and, as a result, has 
breathed new life into the private spaceflight 
industry. 
It is worth noting that the DDTC ruling 
is not without its limits. For example, 
18 As Michael Gold describes it, the ruling covers 
not only the flight phase, but applies to the entire 
"passenger experience" (which has several 
aspects, from sales to training - and, ultimately, 
the flight). 
prospective passengers who are nationals of 
the so-called "Section 126.1 countries" 
would still need a license from the 
appropriate agency before being able to 
enter a Bigelow space habitat. 19 Section 
126.1 of ITAR states that "[i]t is the policy 
of the United States to deny licenses and 
other approvals for exports and imports of 
defense articles and defense services, 
destined for or originating in certain 
countries ... , [including] Belarus, Cuba, 
Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela" as 
well as to "countries with respect to which 
the United States maintains an arms 
embargo (e.g., Burma, China, Liberia, and 
Sudan)."20 Whether foreign crew members 
will also be allowed to fly without a license 
could also conceivable depend on their 
duties on board and their area of expertise, 
since individuals with technical expertise 
who are engaged at work on board may be 
deemed as more capable of accessing and 
understanding the technology around them. 
VI. THE FUTURE IMPACT OF 
BIGELOW'S COMMODITY 
JURISDICTION REQUEST 
The DDTC's ruling on Bigelow's CJ 
request has been heralded by other 
spaceflight companies as a major 
breakthrough that promises to significantly 
ease the regulatory burden on their 
operations.21 Marc Holzapfel, counsel to 
Virgin Galactic, called the ruling a "major 
development" that will enable space 
companies to avoid the "complicated, 
expensive, and dilatory export approval 
process."22 Likewise, the chief counsel of 
SpaceX, Tim Hughes, praised the DDTC for 
adopting "a common-sense approach to 
ITAR.'m 
Although the DDTC's ruling applies 
19 22 C.F.R. §126.1. 
20 Id. 
21 Natasha Loder, Breaking News on US Export 
Control, Overmatter, April 22, 2009, at 





only to Bigelow, it is likely that other space 
companies will receive the same response to 
similar CJ requests. There have been some 
(unconfirmed) reports that both SpaceX and 
Virgin Galactic have filed their own CJ 
requests that rely on Bigelow's CJ request as 
precedent. If these companies receive a 
similar ruling from the DDTC, the space 
tourism/human space flight industry will 
suddenly have easier access to the market of 
foreign nationals - both as passengers on 
space tourism flights and potentially as crew 
members. 
From a broader perspective, Bigelow's 
successful CJ request may signal a paradigm 
shift in the application of IT AR - or at least 
provides an encouraging indication of the 
DDTC's sensitivity to the needs of the 
commercial spaceflight industry. If the 
DDTC continues to exercise its discretion 
with an understanding of how to balance 
national security with commercial reality, 
the commercial space industry would likely 
benefit from a reasonable relaxation of 
export controls. 
The success of the Bigelow CJ request 
may also point the way forward with respect 
to the greater challenge of reducing the 
IT AR burden on the commercial space 
industry as a whole. For example, space 
companies should consider cooperating in 
an orchestrated series of CJ requests that 
will have the effect of carving out certain 
commercial technologies from IT AR 
control. This reliance on the authority and 
discretion of the DDTC officers and other 
administrative staff is perhaps a more 
realistic alternative to formally amending 
the regulations. In the age of terrorism, 
politicians are wary of supporting a bill that 
eases the controls over munitions. By 
giving the DDTC officers an opportunity to 
tailor the application of the existing 
regulations in a reasonable manner, the 
burden of IT AR on commercial space 
enterprises could be reduced significantly. 
Since a CJ request only affects the 
operations of the requesting company, broad 
reform would require a large number of 
space companies to file their own request. 
This would be a daunting task, but is one 
that could be made easier if companies 
would share their CJ requests in order to 
enable other companies to submit similar 
requests. This would obviously require the 
sharing of valuable information with 
competitors - but would be done in order to 
achieve the greater goal of improving the 
competitiveness of the U.S. industry as a 
whole. A nonprofit organization might also 
be created to assist companies with their CJ 
requests. This flood of CJ requests could 
alone transform the IT AR regulatory 
environment - but it might also compel the 
formal amendment of the IT AR regulations 
so that commercial space technology would 
be removed from the USML, and thus 
spared from the crushing weight of IT AR 
compliance. 
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